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Bahrain: “Fragile” Constitutional Amendments, boosting up the Crisis, and not resonating locally and internationally - c.The level of the partnership between the ruling family and the parliament
- Details
- Published on Saturday, 26 May 2012 00:57
- Bahrain: “Fragile” Constitutional Amendments, boosting up the Crisis, and not resonating locally and internationally
- 1-The Content of the Constitutional Amendments the Extent of its Approach to the Demands of the Opposition
- a.Hypothesis of forming a government that is of a peoples’ will
- b.The possibility of ousting the Prime Minister
- c.The level of the partnership between the ruling family and the parliament
- d. The extent to which the “elected” is empowered over the “appointed” in terms of legislation
- e.The reality of controls in the elected council
- f.The sanctification of the authorities solely in the monetary affairs
- g.The problem of political naturalization
- 2-The Mechanism of Constitutional Amendments
- 3-The Local, Regional, and International Opinion regarding the Constitutional Amendments
- 4-The Ability of the Constitutional Amendments on Containing the Bahraini Matter
- Summary
- Table of the Constitutional Amendments Approved by the King of Bahrain on May 3, 2012
- FootNotes
- All Pages
 Bahrain “Fragile” Constitutional Amendments, boosting up the Crisis, and not res | [Bahrain “Fragile” Constitutional Amendments, boosting up the Crisis, and not resonating locally and internationally - ENGLISH] | 716 Kb |
| البحرين: تعديلات دستورية "هشة".. تكرس الأزمة..ولا تلقى صدى محليا ودوليا | [البحرين: تعديلات دستورية "هشة".. تكرس الأزمة..ولا تلقى صدى محليا ودوليا ] | 430 Kb |
C.The level of the partnership between the ruling family and the parliament
Says the official discourse that constitutional amendments verify the concept of "people are the source of authority," through the participation of the elected Representatives Council or the appointed Consultative (Shura) Council, or both together in a series of actions that were before at the absolute authority of the king.While the Constitution grants to "the king to dissolve the Representatives Council by a decree", the amendments made it "after taking the opinion of Presidents of Consultative (Shura) and Representatives Councils and the President of the Constitutional Court" (Article 42/c).
It is unknown here, the precise meaning of "take the opinion", and its level of obligatory to the king, but the most important confusion is that the President of Shura Council and the President of the Constitutional Court are recruited and appointed by the king himself. Besides, the President of theRepresentatives Council who reaches to the top hierarchy through political distribution circuits that is alreadyviolating the principle of “voice of every citizen”(8). And that does ensure a majority of pro-government parliamentary members entering the council and automatically generate a president who fits with the “official royal size”, which in the end give no meaning to “taking opinion” that is supposedly done by the king.
Prior to that, there is an opinion that says "the dissolution of parliament is a sway over the people’s will, and the executive authorities has no right whatsoever to dissolve the parliament"(9).
